Ukraine’s EU Accession After the First Cluster Will Depend on Political Decisions by Member States
Ukraine and Moldova have taken an important step in negotiations on accession to the European Union by opening the first negotiating cluster after prolonged blocking by Hungary. For Kyiv, this is a political signal that had been awaited for more than two years: the process, which for a long time remained hostage to the decisions of individual member states, has finally moved forward. But this breakthrough does not mean that the path to membership will now become fast and direct. On the contrary, after the opening of the first cluster, Ukraine is entering a more difficult stage, where technical readiness no longer guarantees a quick political decision. The European Commission believes that Ukraine and Moldova have fulfilled the conditions for opening the remaining five clusters. However, the final decision depends not only on Brussels’ assessments, but also on the moods, interests and domestic calculations of EU member states.
Time for Action looked into why the opening of the first cluster is an important breakthrough, but does not remove the main risks for Ukraine, why the Irish presidency may create a chance for further movement, and why the problem of Ukraine’s European integration is no longer reduced only to Hungary’s position. From July 1, Ireland takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. For the issue of enlargement, this may be a favorable period. Ireland has a strong symbolic connection to the previous major enlargement of the Union: it was during its presidency in 2004 that the EU accepted ten new countries, including the states of Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus and Malta. For Ireland itself, this still remains a positive historical association, and support for further enlargement among the Irish remains noticeable. In Brussels, Ireland is perceived as a state that can act as an honest mediator. Its government has no sharp bilateral disputes with candidate countries and has not been known for blocking stages of enlargement. This is important because the EU accession process often depends not only on reforms in candidate countries, but also on the ability of the presiding state to organize negotiations, reduce tension between capitals and seek compromises.
However, the Irish presidency is a chance, not a guarantee. It can help keep enlargement on the agenda, speed up technical work and push member states toward decisions. But it cannot independently remove political objections if they exist in Budapest, Warsaw, Bratislava or other capitals. For Ukraine, the nearest goal is to open the remaining negotiating clusters. The European Commission believes that both Ukraine and Moldova have fulfilled the necessary conditions. Brussels hopes that this process may continue at the end of June or already after the presidency passes to Ireland. But doubts about speed remain. And they are connected not only with Hungary.
Hungary really was the most visible obstacle for Ukraine for a long time. The opening of the first negotiating cluster was blocked for almost two years. Recently, Budapest has somewhat softened its position, but this does not mean a complete unblocking of the process. Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, removed the words about the need to open the remaining clusters as soon as possible from the final communiqué during the EU summit. Earlier, he also said that he did not support Ukraine’s accelerated membership and named a period of 10–15 years. This is an important signal. Budapest may no longer block every step as harshly as before, but it is still trying to control the pace of Ukraine’s movement toward the EU. For Kyiv, this means that even after the first breakthrough, the negotiation process may move more slowly than expected. However, the material shows an even more important thing: Hungary may not be the only country that benefits from a slower pace. Other states may be hiding behind Budapest, not wanting to openly slow Ukraine down, but also not rushing to support the fastest possible procedure. This is especially important because for a long time Ukraine’s European integration in the public sphere often looked like a confrontation between Kyiv and Budapest. Now it is clear that the picture is more complicated.
Slovakia’s position also shows caution. Robert Fico called Ukraine’s accession a long-term process. This does not necessarily mean a direct blockade, but it demonstrates that part of Ukraine’s neighbors in the EU are not ready to speak about fast membership. For them, Ukraine’s accession is not only a matter of supporting a state at war. It is a future change in the balance inside the European Union, economic competition, agricultural policy, the transport market and financial flows. The Polish factor may become especially difficult. Poland remains one of the key states for Ukraine’s European path. It is geographically, economically and politically connected with Ukraine much more strongly than most other EU members. That is why its position may have decisive importance for the pace of negotiations.
Warsaw, according to the available signals, does not necessarily oppose Ukraine’s accession. But it may not support the simultaneous opening of all remaining clusters and chapters. For the Polish side, such a step would look like an accelerated procedure, which it opposes. Instead, Poland is leaning toward a gradual approach opening several chapters at a time. At the moment, Warsaw would be ready to support the opening of the sixth cluster, related to foreign policy, but not all at once. This is a very revealing position. Poland may support Ukraine’s European path, while at the same time demanding a slower and more controlled pace. For Kyiv, this means that support from partners does not always equal support for rapid accession. A state may be politically favorable toward Ukraine, but still have its own fears, internal limitations and economic interests.
Brussels is already discussing an option of opening two clusters in July and three more in the autumn. Such a scenario would make it possible to show movement forward, but without the impression of sharp acceleration. This is a compromise option between Kyiv’s position, which is interested in quickly opening the negotiating field, and member states that want to stretch the process and retain more control. The same approach would also be applied to Moldova. This is important because there are no significant political reservations about Chisinau in EU capitals. But Ukraine and Moldova are currently not being separated in the negotiation process. For the EU, this may be politically convenient, because both countries are moving in one package. At the same time, for Moldova this creates a risk: if disputes around Ukraine slow down the process, Chisinau may also move more slowly.
For Ukraine, the main challenge is that formal readiness for negotiations does not remove political fears in EU countries. The European Commission may recognize that conditions have been fulfilled, but decisions are still made by member states. And each of them looks at Ukraine’s accession through its own interests. These interests are not only political. They are also economic. In previous years, this was already visible through farmer protests in eastern EU countries against imports of Ukrainian agricultural products. For some states, Ukraine is not only a future ally, but also a major competitor in agriculture. Ukrainian producers may change the situation on the European agricultural market, influence prices, subsidies and the distribution of support within the EU.
Similar concerns also exist in the transport sector. Some politicians and officials in neighboring countries speak about competition from Ukrainian transport companies. For them, Ukraine’s accession means not only the geopolitical strengthening of the EU, but also the appearance of a large player that may put pressure on local labor markets, logistics and transportation. Accusations regarding corruption in Ukraine are also heard separately. For member states, this is a convenient and politically strong argument that can be used as a basis for a more cautious pace. Even if Ukraine fulfills the requirements of the European Commission, individual capitals may insist on additional checks, longer stages and slower opening of negotiating chapters.
Historical disputes may also increasingly influence European integration policy. In Poland’s case, this is especially noticeable. The complicated history of Ukrainian-Polish relations, the issue of the UPA, the Volyn tragedy and the memory of the events of 1943–1945 may move from the bilateral level into a broader European discussion. When such topics become part of internal political struggle in Poland, they may also influence Warsaw’s position in the EU. The decision of Polish President Karol Nawrocki to strip Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle because of the naming of one Ukrainian military unit after the UPA showed how quickly historical issues can return to the political center. This decision can be explained by internal Polish politics, the struggle of the conservative president with the more liberal and pro-Ukrainian Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and the approaching parliamentary elections. But for Ukraine, it is not only the internal Polish calculation that matters. What matters is that such steps may influence Kyiv’s European path.
Nawrocki appeals to sentiments that already exist in part of Polish society. More right-wing political forces have long used anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, while the party represented by Nawrocki is trying to compete for their voters. This may put Tusk in a difficult position. Even if he generally supports Ukraine, it will be harder for him to openly promote the rapid opening of all negotiating chapters if a significant part of Polish voters supports a tougher position toward Kyiv. Here it is important to see the broader problem. Ukraine’s European integration will increasingly depend not only on reforms in Kyiv, but also on election campaigns, public moods and internal conflicts in EU countries. This makes the process less predictable. Even if the European Commission gives a positive assessment, governments of member states may change the pace depending on their political needs. That is why the first opened cluster is a breakthrough, but not a final victory over blocking. It shows that Ukraine can move forward even after long delays. But it also opens a new reality: ahead there is not one big barrier, but many smaller ones that may arise at every stage.
Ukraine will have to work not only with Brussels, but also with individual capitals. It will be necessary to convince not only the European Commission, but also governments, parliaments, political parties and societies of member states. Hungary will remain a problematic player, but it will not be the only one. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and other neighbors may have their own economic, historical or political reservations. For Kyiv, this means the need for much more complex diplomacy. It is necessary not only to demonstrate fulfillment of the conditions for negotiations, but also to explain to member states how Ukraine’s accession will affect their markets, farmers, transport companies, budget expectations, security interests and domestic politics. Without this work, even a formally successful negotiation process may move slowly. Ukraine’s European integration is gradually moving from the plane of a major political decision into the plane of daily complex agreements. Opening the first cluster was difficult. Opening all the next ones may be even more difficult, because each of them will touch specific areas where member states may have their own complaints or concerns.
The main conclusion for Ukraine is that the first breakthrough does not cancel a long political struggle inside the EU. The European Commission may consider the country ready for the next stages, Ireland may create favorable conditions for enlargement, and Hungary may partly soften its position. But the real difficulty will be not allowing individual fears, historical conflicts, agricultural disputes and internal election campaigns of member states to turn negotiations into a slow wait. Ukraine has taken an important step, but now a stage begins where speed will depend not only on fulfilled conditions, but also on Europe’s political readiness to accept into the Union a large country with a war, a strong agricultural sector, a complicated history with its neighbors and a major impact on the future balance inside the EU.
That is why the first cluster is not the finish line of the breakthrough, but the beginning of a new test. Ukraine has already proven that it is capable of moving forward. Now it will have to prove to every EU capital that its membership is not only a Ukrainian goal, but also part of the future of the European Union itself.
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