Péter Magyar After His Victory in Hungary: What Changes for Ukraine, the EU, and Hungarian Politics Itself
Péter Magyar’s victory marks one of the most notable political shifts in Hungary in recent years. This is not just a change of name at the top of government. It signals the end of a period in which the country’s political course was largely associated with Viktor Orbán personally his governing style, his rhetoric, and his model of foreign policy.
Time for Action has analyzed what Péter Magyar’s victory means for Hungary, what signals he has already sent regarding Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union, and why a change of power in Budapest does not automatically resolve all existing issues in relations with Kyiv.
Péter Magyar did not enter politics as an accidental figure. Born in 1981 into a family of lawyers, he also pursued a legal career. He worked in Brussels, later returned to Hungary, became a banker in a state-owned bank, and led an agency providing student loans. His background combines legal training, experience in a European environment, and an understanding of how state mechanisms function. In his public image, several elements stand out he emphasizes religious beliefs, speaks about family and everyday life, mentions sports, and at the same time tries to present himself as more restrained in politics. This is important because from the outset Magyar positions himself not as a politician of loud gestures, but as someone capable of self-control and pragmatic decision-making. The word “pragmatism” quickly becomes key to understanding his early statements.
In Ukraine, the greatest attention is naturally focused on his position toward Russia and the war. His statement that he will not be a “friend” of Vladimir Putin and will not call him first carries more than symbolic meaning. After years in which Budapest was perceived as a difficult partner for Kyiv and a complicated ally within the EU, this change in tone alone is a political signal. Even more important is his assessment of the war Ukraine is described as a victim of aggression, and the idea of forcing it to give up territory is rejected. For Ukraine, this means that at the level of political language, a different phase may begin. This is not a minor detail. Rhetoric does not replace decisions, but it defines what is acceptable. If Hungary’s new leadership does not build its image on demonstrative closeness to the Kremlin, the space for dialogue with Kyiv and Brussels becomes wider. At the same time, his first statements show that this is not a radical break with previous policy, but rather an adjustment. Magyar expressed readiness for pragmatic dialogue with Russia and did not hide that Hungary will continue purchasing Russian oil. At the same time, he stressed the need for greater diversification of supplies. This is where the limits of change become visible. The new government in Budapest, based on these statements, is not planning to sever economic ties with Russia through a single political decision. For Hungary, energy remains an area where decisions are driven not only by political positioning, but by practical considerations. A shift in tone does not automatically lead to a shift in all policies. However, it changes the framing: Russia is no longer presented as a central political partner, and continued oil purchases are framed as a temporary economic necessity rather than political alignment.
Another important element is Magyar’s statement about his intention to unblock €90 billion in EU funding for Ukraine. If this signal translates into action, it will go beyond rhetoric and reflect a real change in Hungary’s position on one of the most critical issues for Kyiv. This is where the depth of political change will be tested. For Ukraine, it is not enough to hear more favorable statements; it is essential to see Budapest stop obstructing key European decisions. At the same time, his expression of gratitude to Russia and China for recognizing the election results appears more complex. On the surface, it may seem contradictory. On one hand, he distances himself from personal closeness to Putin and recognizes Ukraine as a victim. On the other, he signals readiness to maintain open channels with Moscow and Beijing, emphasizing pragmatic cooperation. These positions are not necessarily incompatible if viewed as an attempt to change political direction without abruptly cutting all ties. This leads to a key point: the question is not whether Magyar will become an “anti-Orbán.” There is little indication of that. Instead, he appears to be positioning himself as a more flexible leader who reduces Hungary’s political friction with the EU and Ukraine while preserving room for maneuver in areas of national interest.
For Ukraine, this creates an opportunity, but not a guarantee. This is reflected in the assessment of Ukraine’s ambassador to Hungary, Fedir Shandor. His position is measured and diplomatic. He does not express excessive optimism, but clearly states that the chances for improving relations exist, and that the reality of being neighboring countries remains unchanged. This is significant because bilateral relations between Kyiv and Budapest include a number of unresolved issues that cannot be addressed solely through a change in leadership. Among these issues are the opening of negotiation clusters for Ukraine’s EU accession, the relaunch of the Ukrainian-Hungarian economic commission, the restoration of expert groups on national minority rights, and the continuation of logistical cooperation, including border crossings and the development of logistics hubs such as Chop-Fényeslitke. These examples show that real improvement depends not on symbolic statements, but on the restoration of concrete mechanisms that have been inactive or stalled for years.
It is particularly notable that some of these mechanisms have not functioned since 2020. This indicates that the challenges in relations between Ukraine and Hungary are not tied solely to Orbán’s leadership. They are embedded at an institutional level. The new government will therefore face not a clean slate, but a set of accumulated disagreements, bureaucratic pauses, and mutual distrust. This is why the question of whether relations will become easier without Orbán does not have a simple answer. At the level of rhetoric, the space for dialogue may expand. At the level of decisions, this remains to be seen. At the institutional level, substantial work lies ahead.
For the European Union, Magyar’s victory also carries significance. Under Orbán, Hungary often became a source of tension within the EU. If the new leadership reduces this level of confrontation, it could lead to more predictable relations with Brussels. However, no immediate transformation should be expected. Magyar does not signal any intention to abandon Hungary’s national interests. The difference may lie in how these interests are pursued through confrontation or negotiation. The future of Orbán himself is a separate issue, but his departure does not erase the political system he built. Parts of the state apparatus, foreign policy habits, and economic dependencies will not disappear overnight. The new leadership will operate within a structure shaped over years. This means that the real test for Magyar will not be his first statements, but his first difficult decisions. For Ukraine, this situation calls for a careful and measured approach. If Budapest is ready to restart joint mechanisms, engage in practical dialogue, and stop blocking critical decisions, it will signal real change. If only the tone shifts while policies remain the same, then the new phase will represent a softer version of the previous approach.
Péter Magyar enters power as a leader promising a different style and a different approach to communication with partners and neighbors. At the same time, his course does not reduce to a simple choice between the West and Russia. He appears prepared to maneuver, maintain economic pragmatism, and rebuild trust where it has been damaged. This is why the key question for Ukraine is not whether Hungary will immediately become a predictable partner. The question is whether its new leadership will consistently begin reopening the channels that have remained closed for years. If that happens, it will already represent a meaningful shift. If not, then even after Orbán’s electoral defeat, the same challenges may continue in a new form.
About the Author
Related posts:
Propaganda in Hungary: How Orbán Uses Zelensky’s Image and Manipulates Public Opinion 
Conflict over money, oil and politics: what lies behind the incident between Ukraine and Hungary 
Hungary and Slovakia Suspend Diesel Supplies: Will Ukraine Face Fuel Shortages? 
Why Relations Between Kyiv and Budapest Have Reached a Breaking Point
