Ukraine Moves Toward Revising Migration Rules Amid Acute Labor Shortage

Ukraine is preparing to revise the list of so-called “migration risk” countries, and this decision already goes far beyond a narrow administrative issue. In reality, it addresses one of the most pressing challenges of the Ukrainian economy the shortage of workers. Businesses are increasingly speaking not about isolated hiring difficulties, but about a systemic labor deficit that is already affecting production, construction, project timelines, and the ability of companies to expand. “Time for Action” analyzed the situation, and it becomes clear that the revision of the migration risk list is not a случайная technical initiative, but a response to a reality in which domestic labor resources are no longer sufficient. The government is not yet talking about a full opening of the labor market to foreign workers, but the very fact that changes are being prepared indicates that authorities can no longer ignore the growing demand from business for simplified rules.

The possibility of revisions became known after a meeting focused on relations with African countries, which took place several weeks ago. Following that meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine were tasked with urgently working on changes to the migration risk list. This list is used when issuing visas and residence permits. Citizens of these countries face additional checks, approvals, and more complex procedures, making legalization longer, more expensive, and less predictable. The list includes certain countries in Asia and Africa, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. In total, it covers around 70 countries. In practice, this means that the state’s risk assessment mechanism directly affects the ability of businesses to recruit foreign workers. And at the moment, this mechanism is increasingly coming into conflict with market needs. For companies, the issue is no longer whether they would like a broader pool of candidates. The question is different: whether they can find workers at all for positions that remain vacant for months.

The scale of the problem is confirmed by data. According to the European Business Association, in 2025 74% of Ukrainian companies experienced a labor shortage. The labor market has lost about 1.3 million taxpayers compared to the pre-war period. In the construction sector, the shortage reaches 30–50%, directly affecting project timelines. For businesses, these figures mean more than inconvenience. They translate into slower recovery, higher costs, disrupted plans, and an inability to operate at full capacity. This is why businesses are increasingly openly discussing the attraction of foreign labor as a practical solution to close the staffing gap. The focus is not on highly qualified IT specialists or top managers. The demand is primarily for mass professions builders, machine operators, warehouse workers, production staff, and employees in woodworking, light industry, packaging, machinery manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, and other sectors where operations depend on available manpower.

The problem is that the current system for employing foreign workers in Ukraine effectively acts as a barrier. Employers state directly that legalizing a foreign worker in Ukraine is significantly more expensive and time-consuming than in comparable countries. Compared to Poland, for example, the cost of legalization in Ukraine is four times higher, and the process takes three times longer. Full legalization of a single worker can cost around 40,000 hryvnias, including official payments and related expenses. At the same time, it is not only about cost. The process can take six to nine months, which for employers often means losing the opportunity entirely. Businesses need workers now, not in a year. If a company has contracts, new production lines, or the need to hire hundreds of workers, a nine-month wait becomes not a procedure, but a standstill. The government explains the strict approach by pointing to risks of illegal migration. Some foreign workers, after receiving documents, leave their employers or use Ukraine as a transit country for further migration to Europe. For the state, this is an issue of security, control, and responsibility for migration flows. For businesses, it represents another disruption: companies invest time and money into recruitment, only to lose workers before those investments begin to pay off.

At this point, the interests of the state and business come into direct tension. The state seeks to minimize migration risks, while businesses want to reduce bureaucracy, speed up procedures, and make the system predictable. Both sides are addressing real issues, but from different perspectives. For officials, the key concern is maintaining control. For employers, it is avoiding a lack of workforce. This is why revising the migration risk list does not mean opening borders to everyone. It is more about partial easing of the approach, aimed at making the system more flexible. Particular attention is now being paid to relations with African countries, but the broader question remains whether Ukraine can create a model of controlled immigration that provides businesses with access to workers while preventing the country from becoming a transit corridor. Public discussions increasingly reflect the idea that Ukrainian businesses are already looking toward mass labor migration. Not as a distant possibility, but as a practical tool for today’s labor market. The shortage is so deep that without external resources, some companies will simply be unable to meet basic staffing needs. This is no longer limited to a single sector. Representatives from food production, chemicals, woodworking, light industry, engineering, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, industrial equipment, and packaging are all involved in the discussion. At the same time, there is no unified position in society or among experts. Some argue for transparency, deregulation, and faster procedures for attracting foreign workers. Their logic is straightforward: if the country is losing labor resources and cannot fill vacancies, it must replenish them. And in large volumes. Another view holds that Ukraine may not need to rely on mass migration from poorer Asian countries, as many Ukrainian refugees could return after the war, provided there are jobs and housing. This is one of the central tensions in the discussion. Businesses are dealing with an immediate shortage that requires urgent solutions. Policymakers, on the other hand, are often guided by expectations of future workforce returns. Both perspectives are grounded in different time horizons. Business operates within today’s deficit, while the state often plans based on future recovery scenarios.

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A telling example is the situation in Zakarpattia, where a furniture factory negotiated the employment of 160 workers from Bangladesh. The company already had 430 employees, but due to expansion needed 700 additional positions. It offered salaries of 25,000 hryvnias and a full social package. The case quickly sparked public debate. Concerns were raised about hiring workers without proper qualification verification and the potential long-term risks. As a result, recruitment was suspended, and visas were denied. This case highlights several key points. First, the demand for workers is real and immediate, not theoretical. Second, society and institutions are not yet ready to fully accept large-scale labor migration as a standard practice. Third, the system itself has not yet developed clear criteria for who should be recruited, for which sectors, and under what conditions.

Therefore, the discussion about revising the migration risk list is not a minor administrative adjustment. It is the beginning of a broader debate about how Ukraine intends to rebuild its economy with a reduced workforce. If procedures remain slow, costly, and complex, businesses will continue to lose time and opportunities. If the system is liberalized too quickly without proper safeguards, the state risks losing control over migration flows. The key question is no longer whether Ukraine needs foreign labor. Based on current data and business feedback, certain sectors already depend on it. The real issue is whether the state can design rules that are fast, clear, and secure at the same time. Without this balance, any reform will remain incomplete, failing to meet business needs while not addressing government concerns. The main conclusion is clear. Ukraine has reached a point where labor shortages can no longer be seen as a temporary inconvenience. It is a structural problem affecting recovery, industry, construction, and everyday business operations. Revising the migration risk list may be the first sign that the state recognizes this. But the real outcome will depend on whether it evolves into a transparent, predictable, and controlled system for attracting workers something the Ukrainian labor market currently lacks.