Ukraine and Poland have clashed over history again: why the scandal around the UPA has become a political risk for Kyiv
A new conflict between Ukraine and Poland arose not because of current military or economic policy, but because of historical memory one of the most painful issues in relations between Kyiv and Warsaw. The reason was the honorary name of the Separate Special Operations Center “North” – “named after the Heroes of the UPA”. For the Ukrainian side, such a step fits into its own logic of honoring forces associated with the struggle for statehood and resistance to Moscow. For a significant part of Polish society, this decision is perceived differently as the official elevation of a force that Warsaw associates with the Volyn tragedy. This difference in perception is exactly what makes the situation so acute. One and the same symbol evokes different historical associations in the two countries. In Ukraine, after 2014, and especially after 2022, the UPA has increasingly been perceived through the lens of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian struggle. For many Ukrainians, it is an image of resistance to Moscow’s imperial policy, a symbol of the pursuit of their own state and historical resistance to subjugation.
In Poland, however, the UPA is almost impossible to separate from Volyn in 1943-1944. For Polish collective memory, this is not an abstract page of history, but a trauma connected with the mass killings of civilians. Warsaw officially considers the Volyn tragedy a genocide of the Polish people. Therefore, any state-level honoring of the UPA by Ukraine automatically causes not an academic discussion in Poland, but a political and social reaction. Here it is important to understand that this is not only about historians or diplomats. Historical memory in Poland has long been part of domestic politics. Issues of Volyn, the UPA, burials, exhumations and commemoration of victims often go far beyond a professional conversation. They become a tool for mobilizing voters, a way to put pressure on political opponents and a test of the “correct” national position. That is why the current scandal quickly moved beyond a diplomatic protest. Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ukrainian ambassador and expressed protest against the decree. But then the issue was picked up by Polish politicians, for whom the Ukrainian question is increasingly becoming part of domestic struggle. This looks especially sharp because of the division of power in Poland between Donald Tusk’s government and President Karol Nawrocki.
Tusk represents a more pragmatic and pro-European line. His government is interested in normal relations with Ukraine, in preserving allied coordination and in ensuring that historical disputes do not destroy cooperation during the war. Nawrocki, on the contrary, relies on a right-conservative electorate for whom historical issues carry high political value. In such a situation, the UPA issue has become a convenient instrument of attack. The demand to strip Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle looks not only like a reaction to the decree. It is also a political trap. If Tusk supports such a decision, he will strike a blow to relations with Kyiv at a moment when Ukraine is fighting against Russia. If he does not support it, he can be accused of indifference to Polish victims. In this situation, Ukraine becomes not only a party to a historical dispute, but also an element of Poland’s election struggle.
For Kyiv, this is especially dangerous because Poland is not just a neighbor. It was one of Ukraine’s key rear partners after the start of the full-scale invasion a significant part of aid passed through Polish territory, Poland received millions of Ukrainians and supported Kyiv on the European track. But precisely because of this, any cooling in relations has broader consequences than an ordinary diplomatic conflict. The most serious risk is the transformation of historical disputes into an instrument for blocking Ukraine’s European integration. Poland, as an EU member state, has political weight and can influence the pace of Ukraine’s movement toward the European Union. If forces in Warsaw grow stronger that want to link historical issues to accession negotiations, this will create a long-term problem for Kyiv. Not necessarily in the form of a complete blockade. Delaying procedures, putting forward additional demands or constant political pressure would be enough.
As long as Tusk’s government maintains a more pragmatic position, this risk looks limited. But the situation may change if Polish domestic politics moves toward harsher anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Especially ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections, when competition between political camps may turn the Ukrainian issue into a convenient platform for demonstrating toughness. The problem is further complicated by the fact that history is not the only line of tension between Ukraine and Poland. Economic competition exists between the countries, above all in the agricultural sector. Polish farmers have repeatedly protested against Ukrainian products, and the issue of Ukrainian grain has turned into a political irritant. If historical claims overlap with economic conflicts, a much wider set of grievances emerges: memory, the market, transport, competition, the EU, the border and elections.
In such a situation, any careless decision can be used as proof that Ukraine supposedly does not take Polish sensitivities into account. At the same time, Ukraine also has a line beyond which it cannot retreat. The state cannot build its own historical policy solely around the reactions of its neighbors. Ukrainian memory of liberation movements, the struggle against the USSR and resistance to Moscow has its own logic. But diplomacy requires understanding how these symbols are read in other countries, especially in those whose support affects Ukraine’s European path. This does not mean that Ukraine must abandon its own historical policy. But it does mean that complex symbols require precise explanation, consistent work with partners and caution in wording. If Kyiv speaks about the UPA only as a symbol of the struggle against Moscow, Warsaw still hears Volyn. If Warsaw speaks about the UPA only through the Volyn tragedy, Kyiv sees an attempt to deny the Ukrainian liberation movement. This is the main knot of the conflict.
Both sides have their own traumas and their own arguments. Poland remembers murdered civilians and demands respect for the victims. Ukraine remembers centuries without statehood, Soviet repression, the struggle against Moscow and its own right to national memory. The problem begins when each side sees only its part of history, and politicians use this painful topic for short-term gain. For Ukraine, the current scandal is a warning. Even during a great war, historical issues do not disappear. They can return at the worst possible moment when the country needs the support of allies, European unity and stable relations with neighbors. And the closer Ukraine moves toward the EU, the more often individual member states may use bilateral problems as a lever of influence.
For Poland, this scandal is also a test. Warsaw has the right to its own memory and to demand respect for the victims. But if historical trauma is turned into a mechanism of pressure against Ukraine during the war with Russia, this works against Poland’s own strategic interests. A weaker Ukraine means a stronger threat from the east. A split between Kyiv and Warsaw benefits neither Ukrainians nor Poles, but Moscow, which has spent years trying to strike precisely at the historical wounds between the two peoples. The main conclusion is simple: the Ukrainian-Polish partnership remains important, but it can no longer rest only on the common threat from Russia. It needs a mature conversation about history, without mutual humiliation, without political traps and without attempts to use memory as a weapon. Ukraine must understand Polish sensitivity to the UPA issue. Poland must understand that for Ukraine, the memory of the struggle for statehood is not an attack on the Polish people. If this does not happen, every new symbolic step will turn into a crisis. And every such crisis will weaken the trust that both countries have built since 2022. At a time when Ukraine is fighting for survival, and Poland remains one of its key neighbors on the path to the EU, this is too high a price for the political use of the past.
About the Author
Related posts:
The Volhynia Question in 2025: How Poland and Ukraine Seek Reconciliation Through Truth 
Poland’s New President Opposes Ukraine’s NATO Bid: Who Is Karol Nawrocki — and Why His Election Matters 
Drone Explosion in Poland: Why the Lublin Incident Is Seen as a Russian Provocation 
Russian Drones over Poland and “Zapad-2025” Exercises: How NATO Reacts to a New Challenge
