Diesel Without Shortage but With an Open Price: How Ukraine Is Navigating a New Fuel Turbulence
March 2026 demonstrated an important point the Ukrainian fuel market has learned to withstand pressure even when external conditions deteriorate sharply. Diesel imports reached 577 thousand tons. This is 27% more than in February and 12% more than in March last year. For this month, this figure became the highest since 2021. By itself, this result is already notable, because it was achieved not in a calm period, but at a time when the market was operating under the pressure of the war in the Middle East, price spikes, supply disruptions, and overall instability in global fuel trade. Time for Action has analyzed why record diesel imports do not mean calm for the consumer, how Ukrainian traders managed to prevent a shortage, and why the main issue now lies not in the physical availability of fuel, but in how much it may cost in the near future.
At first glance, the figures appear reassuring. A large volume of diesel was imported. A carryover stock for April has been formed. Retail networks have also contracted supplies for the next month. At the same time, a decline in sales is observed, which means demand is not putting pressure on the system as it might during a period of panic. In such a configuration, a shortage does not appear to be an immediate scenario. This is one of the key differences from past crises, when the market lost not only price balance but also basic physical stability. However, this calm is only partial. Behind the large import volume lies a more complex reality. The market endured March thanks to the rapid reorientation of supplies, the prompt replacement of disrupted routes, and the willingness of importers to operate under extremely high volatility. This means that the current margin of stability was not automatic, but achieved through active response. Fuel arrived not because external conditions were favorable, but because Ukrainian companies managed to quickly adjust logistics and maintain volumes where they were at risk of decline.
At the beginning of March, the situation in Poland added uncertainty. The largest supplier, the Polish company ORLEN, temporarily suspended shipments. At the same time, uncertainty persisted in the Romanian and Greek directions. All of this occurred while the global fuel market was already feeling the effects of the war in the Middle East. Export premiums were rising, prices were fluctuating sharply, and contracting fuel became increasingly difficult. Under such conditions, any disruption in a major supply channel could quickly escalate into a broader market problem. This is where the Ukrainian market demonstrated what can be described as a new survival practice. Supplies from Poland overall remained at a high level 244 thousand tons, which is 4% more than in February and 51% more than in March 2025. Although ORLEN itself reduced volumes by 22% to 81 thousand tons, these losses were quickly compensated. Deliveries from the Polish terminal Dębogórze increased by 81% to 63.3 thousand tons. This is one of the most important signals of March the Ukrainian market is no longer as dependent on a single channel or a single major supplier as it might have been before. It has learned to find substitutes within the same geographic supply framework. This is even more evident in the southern direction. During winter, it was limited by the low frost resistance of the product, but with the arrival of spring, supplies increased sharply. The share of southern deliveries in total imports rose to 48% compared to 27% in February. In physical terms, this amounts to 276 thousand tons, which is 2.3 times more. At the same time, the share of the western direction decreased from 73% to 52%, although in absolute terms the decline was not critical 304 thousand tons, or 9% less. This shift in supply structure shows that the market is not only increasing volumes, but also redistributing sources depending on seasonality, resource availability, and external risks.
Among individual countries, Romania’s role increased particularly noticeably. Imports from Romania grew 3.6 times and reached 154 thousand tons the highest level in the past six months. Supplies from Greece also increased by 36% to 119.3 thousand tons. Together, this indicates that the southern vector effectively supported the market at a time when other supply channels remained under pressure. For Ukraine, such diversification is no longer an advantage. It has become a necessary condition for fuel stability. It is also important to note the composition of importers. In March, their number increased by 14 companies to 124. This is another important indicator. When the market becomes more complex but also includes a broader range of participants, its ability to distribute risks increases. The leader in volumes remains OKKO with 92.3 thousand tons, which is 24% more than in February. UPG ranked second with 53.7 thousand tons. There was also noticeable growth among several other suppliers, including those that were previously less prominent. This suggests that the market is not dependent on a few large players alone, but is gradually expanding its base.
However, the main line of March is not that Ukraine imported a large volume of diesel, but at what cost this stability is achieved. The global fuel crisis, triggered by the war in the Middle East, quickly translated into the Ukrainian market. After strikes by the United States and Israel on Iran, oil prices began to rise, and by March 9 exceeded the level of 100 dollars per barrel. Brent reached approximately 106 dollars, and at its peak 119. American WTI traded around 102 dollars. The reasons were clear: reduced production by several major producers and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for global energy transit. For Ukraine, this means a direct import of external instability. The country does not have sufficient domestic resources to isolate its internal market from global shocks. Therefore, every global price increase quickly translates into higher import costs. Based on international benchmarks, the cost of diesel at the border may reach 95 hryvnias per liter. Additional costs include transportation within Ukraine, operational expenses of fuel stations, and retail margins. In this structure, a retail price around 100 hryvnias per liter no longer appears unrealistic. It reflects a logical outcome if external conditions remain unchanged.
Wholesale prices are already in the range of 90 to 93.5 hryvnias per liter. This means the market is approaching a psychologically significant threshold. The key challenge in the coming weeks is clear fuel will be available, but its affordability will depend on price rather than supply. Ukraine is entering a phase where availability shifts into the issue of cost. Another important factor is that high prices affect not only consumers, but also importers. Contracting becomes more expensive, and purchasing the same volumes requires significantly higher working capital. For large networks, this is manageable, but for smaller players it may become a serious limitation. If this situation persists, market stability will depend not only on resource availability in Europe, but also on the financial capacity of Ukrainian companies to secure and deliver it.
At the same time, declining sales act as a temporary stabilizer. On one hand, this helps maintain reserves and prevents physical shortages. On the other hand, it indicates that high prices are already affecting demand. Reduced consumption is not a sign of a healthy market, but rather a short-term adjustment that provides some breathing space. The government has already responded to the sharp increase in fuel prices by extending the “National Cashback” program to fuel purchases. However, this measure does not change the fundamental dependence of the Ukrainian market on global conditions. As long as the global market remains unstable, domestic consumers will remain exposed to external price dynamics.
March 2026 became a stress test for fuel imports. The Ukrainian market passed this test. Traders increased supplies, quickly adjusted routes, utilized the southern direction, maintained reserves, and entered April without signs of physical shortage. This is a significant result for a country fully dependent on diesel imports while operating under conditions of war and global energy instability. At the same time, this result should not be interpreted as full stability. It reflects something else the Ukrainian market has become more resilient, but not independent from external price shocks. The risk of shortage has receded, but the issue of price has moved to the forefront. It is this factor that will determine how difficult the next phase of fuel turbulence will be for Ukraine.













