The EU Covers Most of Ukraine’s Needs, but a Funding Gap for 2027 Is Already Emerging
The current situation looks dual in nature. On the one hand, the financial outlook for 2026 appears significantly more stable. European partners state directly that the necessary resources for this year have already been confirmed, meaning that the main needs of Ukraine should be covered. On the other hand, Brussels already acknowledges that such certainty does not exist for 2027. This is an important signal, because financing a country at war cannot be postponed until a deficit becomes a reality.
Time for Action has analyzed why, despite statements about large-scale support for Ukraine from the European Union, another issue is becoming increasingly clear the lack of confirmed financing for part of Ukraine’s needs already in 2027. Formally, this concerns about one third of the required funds. In practice, it is one of the key risks for Ukraine’s stability in the medium term.
The European Union plans to cover two thirds of Ukraine’s external financing needs in 2026–2027 through a loan of €90 billion. This means €45 billion per year. It is a substantial amount that shows the EU is taking on the main burden of supporting Ukraine’s budget, defense, and overall functioning of the state. However, these two thirds are not the full picture. The remaining third is expected to come from other international partners: G7 countries, international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, as well as individual EU member states providing bilateral support. This is where the main issue arises. While this part of the support is confirmed for 2026, it is not confirmed for 2027. This means that even with a large European package, Ukraine still depends on how consistently and timely other partners act. In other words, the foundation seems to be in place, but the full structure is not yet complete.
It is important to understand that these are not abstract figures. According to preliminary estimates, Ukraine’s external needs in 2026 amount to €71.7 billion. Of this, €20.1 billion are macro-financial needs and €51.6 billion are military needs. In 2027, international support is estimated at €64 billion, including €32.2 billion in macro-financial needs and €31.8 billion in military needs. These are not auxiliary expenditures, but funds without which neither the state nor its defense can function. That is why the uncertainty for 2027 should be seen not as a technical issue, but as a strategic one. When a country is engaged in a large-scale war, budgetary and military support must be planned in advance. Any delay, any gap between political decisions and actual disbursement becomes a direct risk under such conditions.
There is also a political dimension to this situation. The €90 billion loan was politically agreed in Europe back in late 2025. In February 2026, the document was signed by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola. However, political agreement proved insufficient. For the funds to be released, approval from all EU member states is required. This is why the blocking by Hungary became not just an inconvenience, but a critical factor that delayed the entire mechanism. This highlights an important point: even when there is political consensus within the EU on supporting Ukraine, the actual mechanism remains vulnerable to internal vetoes and the use of this issue as leverage. The condition set by the Hungarian government, linking the unblocking of support to the restoration of Russian oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline, clearly demonstrates that Ukraine-related decisions can become part of broader political bargaining.
At the same time, the European Commission has not halted technical preparations. On the contrary, it continues working as if the decision will be implemented as soon as possible once the blockade is lifted. At the beginning of April, a package of documents was approved detailing the volume of support, allocation of funds, and specific mechanisms for procurement, particularly for Ukraine’s defense sector. This indicates that Brussels is trying to minimize delays and be ready in advance. The structure of funding for 2026 also reflects EU priorities. Of the €45 billion planned for that year, €16.7 billion will go to budgetary needs, while €28.3 billion will be allocated to the military, defense, and weapons production. This means that the majority of funds are directly tied to defense. Support is no longer just about sustaining Ukraine’s economy, but about ensuring its capacity to fight and maintain its defense capabilities.
It is particularly notable that the first tranche of military assistance under this loan is expected to be directed toward procurement of Ukrainian-made drones. This signals several things at once. First, the EU recognizes the importance of Ukraine’s domestic defense industry. Second, support is increasingly focused not only on external supplies but also on internal production capacity. Third, funding is becoming more directly linked to tangible defense outcomes. At the same time, budgetary support will be tied to strict conditions related to the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, economic resilience, and sustainability. This is another important aspect. The EU is not simply providing funds, but embedding them within a broader framework of governance requirements. Therefore, future support will depend not only on political will, but also on Ukraine’s ability to demonstrate stability and compliance with agreed conditions.
Another layer of this situation is linked to expectations following political changes in Hungary. After parliamentary elections, there are hopes within the EU that a new government may unblock the €90 billion loan, remove its veto on new sanctions against Russia, and improve relations with partners in the EU and NATO. However, these are expectations, not confirmed outcomes. This again illustrates how fragile even critical support mechanisms can be when they depend on unanimous decisions. Overall, the current picture is not a crisis, but it already contains a warning. Funding for 2026 appears secured. The EU is taking on the main share, technical preparations are ongoing, and the first disbursements are expected soon after the veto is lifted. However, a gap is forming for 2027, and it remains unresolved. This gap is the key signal for both Ukraine and its partners. The issue is no longer only whether the EU can deliver its share. The question is whether the broader international support system can function consistently rather than intermittently. Two thirds of funding is substantial, but for a country at war on this scale, it is insufficient if the remaining third remains uncertain. The main conclusion is clear: short-term stability does not eliminate medium-term risks. Ukraine has a financial foundation for 2026, but decisions that secure 2027 are needed already now. Otherwise, what is currently described as a future problem may quickly become a present one.












