Ukraine as an “Enemy”: Why Relations Between Kyiv and Budapest Have Reached a Breaking Point
Ukraine is an enemy. This phrase, spoken by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban from the stage of an “anti-war rally” in the city of Szombathely, became more than just another harsh statement. It fixed the state of relations between Kyiv and Budapest, which over the past week have passed through several points of tension at once from diplomacy and security to sports and public morality.
Orban linked his words to EU decisions to abandon Russian energy resources. According to his logic, it is Ukraine that allegedly constantly pressures Brussels, demanding to cut Hungary off from “cheap Russian energy.” “Anyone who says such things is an enemy of Hungary, therefore Ukraine is our enemy,” he stated. In this formula, not only the statement itself matters, but also its context: Budapest’s energy dependence on Russia has long been a subject of criticism within the EU, and Ukraine has become a convenient addressee for shifting responsibility.
Six months earlier, when Hungary was still benefiting from sanction exemptions and continued to receive Russian oil, Kyiv carried out strikes on the Druzhba oil pipeline. The Ukrainian side viewed this as part of pressure on Russian energy infrastructure, while Budapest saw it as an encroachment on Hungary’s sovereignty. Since then, disputes have only accumulated, layering one on top of another. At the same time, a long-standing line of conflict over the rights of national minorities continued. Orban repeatedly accused Ukraine of oppressing Hungarians in Transcarpathia and used this as an argument to block Ukraine’s progress in the EU. As a result, in 2025 Kyiv, despite technical readiness, did not open a single negotiation cluster. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded publicly and sharply. During the World Economic Forum in Davos, he stated that “every Viktor who lives on Europe’s money and at the same time tries to sell European interests deserves a slap on the back of the head.” This phrase became another marker that diplomatic formulas were being exhausted.
In response, Orban spoke of “daily threats from Ukraine from President Volodymyr Zelensky, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, and their special services.” The security dimension escalated further in May 2025, when the Security Service of Ukraine announced the exposure of an agent network of Hungarian military intelligence in Transcarpathia. Budapest called the accusations anti-Hungarian propaganda, expelled Ukrainian diplomats, and later announced the identification of “Ukrainian spies.” Mutual accusations thus finally moved from rhetoric into direct action.
During the summer, the conflict gained an emotionally sensitive dimension through the issue of mobilization of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine. After the death of Transcarpathian resident Yosyp Shebeshten, the Hungarian side insisted on a version involving beating during forced conscription. The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that he was lawfully mobilized as a Ukrainian citizen and died from pulmonary artery thromboembolism, with no signs of violence. The divergence of versions became grounds for new ultimatums. On February 4, Orban announced that persons involved in “forced conscription” would be immediately expelled from Hungary.
A few days later, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto went even further, declaring “a manhunt for Ukrainians”on the streets. He also defended a Hungarian citizen detained by Ukrainian border guards for helping men illegally cross the border to flee mobilization. The Ukrainian side called such statements manipulative and politicized, pointing out the complete absence of any mention of Russian aggression.
Even sport did not remain outside the conflict. During the WTA 250 tennis tournament in Cluj-Napoca, Ukrainian tennis player Oleksandra Oliinykova refused a handshake and a joint photo with Hungary’s Anna Bondar due to the latter’s participation in tournaments in Russia during the full-scale invasion. The Ukrainian athlete explained her position sharply and uncompromisingly: “To go in December 2022 to a tournament in Russia and accept payment from Gazprom funds from a moral point of view, this is the same as going to play a tournament in Nazi Germany in 1941 and receiving a reward in the form of jewelry taken from Jews murdered in the death camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka. The same evil only 80 years later.” Szijjarto responded by insisting that sport should not be mixed with politics, although politics has long become the defining backdrop of these relations.
The roots of the current crisis reach back at least to 2014. After the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, Ukraine began changing legislation, including laws on the status of the Ukrainian language in education and the public sphere. At the same time, Orban spoke about the need for autonomies for Hungarians in neighboring countries. Budapest’s response included blocking NATO meetings with Ukraine, and after Russia’s full-scale invasion blocking Ukraine’s progress in the EU, opposing sanctions, and resisting aid through the European Peace Facility.
Experts directly link the current escalation to Hungary’s internal politics. According to analysts, “Orban almost perceives Ukraine as an enemy,” and the Ukrainian issue has become a tool for mobilizing voters ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for April 12, 2026. The Hungarian prime minister himself claims that pressure from Kyiv “will continue until the elections,” accusing the Ukrainian authorities of trying to influence the vote.
Analysts agree that after the elections the level of tension may slightly decrease, but a sharp reversal should not be expected. Even in the event of a change of power, Hungary is unlikely to stop using the Ukrainian issue as a bargaining chip with Brussels especially in the context of frozen EU funds and disputes over the rule of law. “We will definitely see some improvement, because it is almost impossible for things to get worse than they are now,” experts note, while acknowledging that systemic problems will remain. Under these conditions, Ukraine’s relations with Hungary are no longer merely a bilateral issue. They are increasingly embedded in a broader European context, where domestic elections in one country can directly affect the pace of another country’s European integration. And regardless of who wins in Budapest, Kyiv will have to seek a form of dialogue with a government that has already made confrontation part of its political strategy.
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