The Quiet University Front: How China Expands Influence in the Balkans Through Education
While Europe increasingly measures China’s presence in the Balkans through investments, loans, and technology deals, Beijing is simultaneously advancing a different instrument less visible, but far more long-term. Educational programs, scholarships, university exchanges, and the stories of young people who share their lives in China with audiences back home are creating not infrastructure of concrete and steel, but infrastructure of trust. It works slowly, yet it is precisely these mechanisms that later shape societal choices.
Chinese educational opportunities in the Balkans are often described as an attractive package: free tuition, scholarships, and access to rapidly developing universities. Some students turn this experience into a public diary on social media and gather sizable audiences. Others are invited to appear in official Chinese media or institutions. This is no longer just student exchange, but a channel where personal experience becomes a way to shape perceptions of a country.
One example that illustrates how views change is 24-year-old Era Kernaya from northern Albania. She studies computer science at Kunming University of Science and Technology in Yunnan province and explains her initial decision without elaborate motivation: “I applied [for a Chinese language course] out of curiosity, because it was a new language I had never studied before.” What matters is not the application itself, but the transformation of her view of the country: “If someone had asked me three years ago, I would have said that China is a closed communist country, but now [my opinion] has [completely] changed.” Kernaya is not only studying she communicates with her audience back home. Since 2023, she has been running a TikTok account about life in China and has more than 8,000 followers. Her motivation sounds like an attempt to correct stereotypes: “I wanted to change Albanians’ perception of China and tell them not to believe everything they see.”This is where a key feature of this strategy becomes visible: Beijing gains carriers of narratives that sound more convincing than official speeches because they are delivered through everyday details, routine, studies, and subjective experience.
Analysts directly point to the long-term purpose of these programs: building personal networks, shaping favorable narratives, and preparing future professionals with firsthand experience of life in China who are willing to share it at home. This becomes a complement to political and economic influence and helps prepare an audience more receptive to the expansion of China’s presence and the promotion of its interests in the region.
Stefan Vladisavljev, an expert on China’s role in the Balkans at the Belgrade-based analytical center Foundation BFPE, formulates Beijing’s interest clearly: “Beijing is interested in attracting as many foreign students and researchers to China as possible.” He explains how this fits into a broader strategy: “China seeks to position itself as a provider of development, and presence in Europe is a very important aspect of its global strategy.” In this logic, education is not a humanitarian add-on, but an instrument of positioning. What is particularly notable is that educational influence works even in countries that are traditionally pro-Western in their political orientation. Albania and Kosovo have historically been linked to the United States through support for their statehood and democratic development. They do not appear to be “obvious” platforms for Chinese influence. Yet the trend is visible and growing, driven by young people’s demand for educational and economic opportunities. At the same time, China’s regional foothold in the Balkans has traditionally run through Serbia. Belgrade has attracted billions in investments and built close political ties with Beijing. Serbia stands out as the most advanced partner in education: three Confucius Institutes operate there, and Chinese is taught in dozens of schools. Over 20 years, participation in educational programs has grown from a few dozen to several hundred people annually, with cooperation boosted by several new bilateral agreements signed in 2018. Vladisavljev sees this as a bridge beyond the region itself: “If China has a foothold in the Western Balkans, it has one in Europe as well.”
Confucius Institutes, which function as channels of educational exchange, have long been controversial in the West. In Europe and beyond, several governments have closed them due to concerns over academic freedom and political influence. In the Balkans, however, these institutes are often viewed pragmatically as springboards to scholarships, courses, and universities. In Albania, the Confucius Institute at the University of Tirana, where Kernaya studied Chinese and received assistance in applying for a scholarship, presents itself as a “non-governmental, non-profit educational institute” cooperating with Beijing Foreign Studies University. It offers scholarships and helps students submit applications both to individual universities and at federal and national levels in China. Such institutes exist throughout the Western Balkans except Kosovo, whose independence China does not recognize and where it therefore has no official presence.
Another layer of this story is media amplification. Because Chinese and local Balkan institutions do not publish data, there is no public statistics showing how many Balkan students study in China. What is known is something else: Radio Free Europe found that several Albanian students studying in China have appeared in Chinese state media, including the Albanian-language service of China Radio International (CRI), part of China’s main state broadcaster CGTN, where they spoke positively about their experience. This is not a random detail: when a student becomes a feature in state media, they turn into an element of a broader communication strategy. In Kosovo, despite the absence of official cooperation, the topic still exists through individual students, often from the diaspora in Europe and North America. Vlera Kelmendi, born in Kosovo and later migrating to Norway, said in an interview with the local ATV television channel in 2025 that she chose China out of curiosity and described her experience there as very positive. She has more than 16,000 followers on TikTok and reaches an audience in Kosovo, where public opinion toward China remains largely negative. Kelmendi declined to give an interview to Radio Free Europe, but her very presence illustrates how an information bridge can emerge even without diplomatic infrastructure.
The director of the Confucius Institute in Tirana, Zheng Baoguo, acknowledged growing interest from Kosovo students and stated his position plainly: “We would be happy to see students from Kosovo studying the Chinese language,” he said, adding: “If they are interested, we will do everything possible to create opportunities for them.” In practice, this signals that even without official presence, Beijing seeks to respond to demand through neighboring countries.
In North Macedonia, the path to China was much simpler for 26-year-old Kadir Ismaili. He received a Chinese government scholarship for a master’s program in Yunnan province with the help of the embassy. Like others in this phenomenon, he builds trust through everyday observation and online presence: he has gathered more than 31,000 followers on TikTok and explains his approach simply: “I started TikTok for business, but if I see something interesting here I post it.” He describes reactions back home as a shift in perception: “People back home say they had no idea what China is really like.” Over the past decade, about 100 Macedonian students have studied in China through language and university programs. Research by the Skopje-based analytical center Estima notes that “perceptions of China in North Macedonia are mixed, but more positive among people who have had direct experience interacting with China.” According to Estima, the number of Chinese scholarships for North Macedonian students has increased since 2005.
Similar programs are developing in other countries as well. A report by the Center for European Policy Analysis notes that a Confucius Institute has been operating in Montenegro since 2015, and during this period more than 100 students have been sent to China. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is an official student exchange agreement with China, and China-funded programs continue to expand, notably through the University of East Sarajevo, where more than 170 students have participated in exchanges.
One of these stories is that of 23-year-old Ana Jasarevic, who studied at the Chinese language department of the University of East Sarajevo and spent the past year at Wuhan University. Her first impression sounds like a typical reaction to a radically different system: “When we arrived, it was a bit of a cultural shock, because everything was completely different.” What follows, however, is an assessment that builds trust: “I liked it there, although I understand that many people do not like how everything is organized,” she said. And another detail that is decisive for many audiences: “I visited many cities, traveled around the country, and everywhere I felt safe.” After graduating, she plans to apply for a master’s program in China.
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All these stories form a single mechanism. China offers education as an opportunity and, in return, gains people who later reproduce a desired image of the country through personal experience. Vladisavljev directly compares this approach with the most effective model of soft power: “China is taking cues from the country that uses soft power best: the United States.” This explains why the focus is not only on large infrastructure projects, which always attract attention and criticism, but also on educational trajectories that appear neutral and beneficial.
For the Balkans, this story is not about sympathy or antipathy toward China. Young people see real chances in these programs to learn a language, obtain a degree, and build a career path. For Europe more broadly, the question is different: how regional perspectives change when a generation that shapes its worldview through experience and social media increasingly speaks of China as a place of opportunity rather than threat. And how long this “quiet university front” will continue to soften resistance to Beijing’s economic and political interests in countries that not long ago seemed resistant to such influence.
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