Zelenskyy and Trump in Davos: What the January 22 Meeting Was Really About
The meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump in Davos took place at a moment when expectations from diplomacy had sharply declined, while the need for concrete decisions had, on the contrary, increased. The conversation lasted more than an hour and ended without joint statements, but with a clear signal: the sides were speaking not “about peace in general,” but about the war as it exists right now. After the meeting, Trump limited himself to a short phrase for journalists:
“The war has to end.”
Without details, without timelines, and without explaining how exactly this should happen. This restraint sharply contrasted with his public rhetoric from the forum stage, where he repeatedly reduced the war to personal relations between leaders.
Zelenskyy, by contrast, spoke much more concretely and publicly fixed the applied nature of the dialogue:
“We discussed the work of our teams, and in fact there are meetings or communication every day. The documents are even more prepared. We also talked today about air defense for Ukraine the previous meeting with President Trump helped protect the sky. And I hope that this time we will also strengthen ourselves.”
This emphasis is important. For Ukraine, the Davos meeting did not look like a political gesture or an attempt to “demonstrate dialogue.” It was about concrete tools first and foremost air defense and about prepared documents, not intentions to “start working.”
At the same time, Zelenskyy publicly announced a trilateral meeting between Ukraine, the United States, and russia in the UAE on January 23–24 and named the composition of the Ukrainian delegation. This decision immediately raised the stakes. Not only diplomats but also representatives of the security bloc are being involved, which indicates that the discussion will not be symbolic formulas but issues directly related to the war. Against this background, Trump’s public statements from the Davos stage sounded contradictory. On the one hand, he spoke about proximity to agreements and emphasized the need to end the war because of the scale of losses:
“This is a bloodbath. This is a drone war. Drones are killing thousands of people a week.”
On the other hand, he constantly shifted the focus away from russia as a state aggressor toward personal mutual hatred between Zelenskyy and Putin:
“There is tremendous hatred between President Zelenskyy and President Putin. This is not good for settlements.”
This approach simplifies reality and devalues the very nature of the war. It is convenient for political rhetoric, but it poorly explains why hostilities continue regardless of personal sympathies or antipathies. Even sharper were Trump’s words about Europe’s role. He effectively stated that responsibility for Ukraine does not lie with the United States: “They should be working on Ukraine, not us.” This message became one of the most alarming signals of Davos, as it overlaps with general Western fatigue and reluctance to assume long-term commitments.
It was precisely here that Zelenskyy moved into the next phase of public pressure this time on Europe. In his speech, he openly spoke about EU inaction on sanctions and security. In particular, he called on Europe to stop russian tankers and confiscate oil, asking a direct question: “Why can President Trump stop the shadow fleet tankers and take the oil, but Europe cannot?”
The topic of Greenland sounded as a separate block. Zelenskyy spoke about it not as an abstract geopolitical dispute, but as a test of Europe’s ability to act: “If you send 40 soldiers to Greenland, what is this for? What kind of message is this?” In this question, he effectively held up a mirror to Europe between statements about security and real actions.
Even harsher were his words about russian missile production: “russia would not be able to produce any ballistic or cruise missiles without critical components from other countries… Europe says almost nothing, America says nothing, and Putin makes missiles.” This was no longer diplomacy, but a direct public claim against allies.
As a result, Davos on January 22 showed not a convergence of positions, but different understandings of responsibility. Ukraine spoke the language of action and concrete needs. The United States spoke the language of political signals and distancing. Europe found itself between these two positions, demonstrating uncertainty on issues where decisions, not discussions, are required. This day in Davos did not provide answers about how and when the war will end. But it clearly showed something else: the time when it was possible to hide behind formulas and general statements is over. And each side has already begun to speak not as is convenient, but as it considers necessary.
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The Greenland conflict and the disrupted agreements on Ukraine’s reconstruction in Davos 
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