Ukraine–Poland Relations: Between Solidarity, Fatigue, and Historical Memory
Over nearly four years of full-scale war, mutual perceptions between Ukrainians and Poles have changed noticeably. The emotional closeness and sense of a shared threat that defined the first months after February 24, 2022 have gradually given way to a more complex and contradictory picture. Support for Ukraine within Polish society remains, but it is no longer unconditional and is increasingly accompanied by fatigue, skepticism, and a return to painful historical issues.
This is evidenced by the results of a new public opinion study presented during an expert discussion in Zhovkva a city that itself symbolizes the layered Ukrainian-Polish past. The very format of the meeting a conversation about cooperation between border communities, the role of local self-government, and the impact of historical memory set the framework for analyzing not only figures, but also the deeper reasons behind them. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, positive changes in Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Poles were nearly universal. In 2022, 75% of Ukrainian respondents said their opinion of Poles had improved, while only 1% reported a deterioration. Three years later, the picture is different. In 2025, only 27% of Ukrainians reported an improvement, 53% said their attitude had not changed, and the share of those whose opinion worsened rose to 17%. This shift developed gradually and was driven not by a single factor, but by the overlap of several processes from everyday conflicts and economic competition to political decisions at the border. Polish society shows a similar dynamic, although from different starting points. In 2022, 39% of Poles declared a positive attitude toward Ukrainians, while 22% expressed a negative one. Today, positivity stands at 43%, but negativity has increased to 35%. These figures do not indicate a sharp reversal, but they clearly point to a trend toward polarization. Assistance to Ukraine is increasingly moving from a source of national pride to a cause of internal tension. This is particularly visible in attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees. If at the start of the war assistance was perceived as a moral duty, today 26% of Poles say they would not help at all in the event of a new wave of refugees, while another 18% would do so only to a limited extent. Active assistance is declared by 14%, and restrained support by 26%. The question of state support has also lost consensus: only 35% of Poles believe Poland should continue supporting Ukrainian refugees, while 39% are convinced it should not.
At the same time, personal contact remains the most effective factor in reducing prejudice. Where Poles and Ukrainians live in the same locality, the level of positive attitudes reaches 70%; among coworkers it is 67%, and among neighbors 66%. Sixty-nine percent of Poles say they personally know someone from Ukraine, and 22% work or study alongside Ukrainians. These figures show that everyday interaction often dismantles generalized fears and stereotypes, even when the broader information environment becomes more tense.
Historical memory forms another layer of strain. More than 40% of Polish respondents, as in previous years, believe that there were events in Polish-Ukrainian history for which Ukrainians today should feel guilt toward Poles. For many Poles, especially those aged 45–65, the events in Volhynia are not an abstract textbook chapter but an emotional inheritance that shapes contemporary perceptions of Ukraine. In this same context, Stepan Bandera is viewed in Poland exclusively as a symbol of crime, while in Ukraine he holds a different historical and political status. The absence of a shared narrative here turns into a source of everyday conflict. The issue of exhumation and burial of victims of the Volhynia tragedy remains one of the key markers of an “unfinished past” for Polish society. Fifty-seven percent of Polish respondents believe Ukraine should grant permits for exhumations and proper burials more quickly. Twenty-seven percent support postponing the process until after the end of hostilities, 7% believe the issue should not be revisited at all, and 9% have no formed opinion. These figures reflect not only demands toward the Ukrainian side, but also the internal heterogeneity of Polish public opinion.
Ukrainian respondents, in turn, also appeal to historical memory. About 30% of Ukrainians believe Poles should feel guilt toward Ukrainians for events of the past. In western regions of Ukraine, this figure rises to 45%. At the same time, 54% of Ukrainians support the idea of mutual apologies as a step toward improving relations, while 40% see no sense in apologies. Another third of Ukrainian respondents say they do not see significant disputes in Polish-Ukrainian relations, pointing to a substantial internal divide in how the problem is perceived within Ukraine itself.
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Economic factors add yet another layer of complexity. Competition for jobs, social benefits, housing, places in schools and kindergartens, as well as the opening of the European Union market to Ukrainian agricultural products, have become irritants for parts of Polish society. Added to this is the language factor: the use of Russian by some Ukrainians in Poland is often perceived negatively and generalized to all Ukrainians, regardless of their origin or stance on the war.
Despite all this, the strategic dimension of relations remains stable. Eighty-eight percent of Ukrainians hope for Poland’s support during the war, and most Poles continue to see Ukrainians as neighbors and victims of Russian aggression. Sixty-four percent of Poles define Ukrainians as neighbors, 62% as victims of the war, 31% as allies or economic partners, while 33% already perceive them as competitors. At the same time, a significant share of Ukrainians is convinced that Russia deliberately uses informational and political tools to worsen Ukrainian-Polish relations. The shift in attitudes does not mean a rupture. Rather, it signals a transition from the extreme solidarity of wartime shock to a more complex, less emotional phase of coexistence. Polish society increasingly demands policies based on an assessment of consequences rather than solely on moral impulses. Ukrainian society, in turn, reacts more sharply to any signs of distrust or restrictions from its closest ally.
In this situation, local practices of cooperation joint cultural initiatives, work with historical memory, and community-level contacts remain the most effective tools for reducing tension. The experience of border regions shows that where there is regular interaction and shared projects, historical traumas do not disappear, but they stop defining everyday life. And it is precisely whether these practices can move beyond individual towns and municipalities that will determine whether Ukrainian-Polish relations can maintain a balance between memory, solidarity, and growing fatigue.
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