EU accession talks during wartime: where Ukraine really stands at the end of 2025 and what is slowing the process
In December 2025, Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly stated: “Ukraine is doing everything to open negotiation clusters with the EU.” A few days later, the interagency working group approved negotiation positions for the two final clusters, and after government approval the country will be technically ready to start negotiations across all clusters. Formally, this looks like the final straight before a major European integration phase. In reality, the picture is more complex and contradictory.
Ukraine’s path to the European Union did not begin in 2022. It dates back to 1994, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed, entering into force in 1998. In the 2000s, cooperation deepened through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, with gradual approximation of legislation to EU norms. However, in 2013, under President Viktor Yanukovych, this trajectory was effectively halted: despite an agreed text of the Association Agreement, it was not signed due to pressure from the Kremlin.
After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine signed the Association Agreement with the EU and launched DCFTA the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. This marked the start of large-scale institutional transformation: the creation of NABU, SAPO, HACC, civil service reform, and deregulation. In 2017, Ukraine received visa-free travel with the EU, which became recognition of fulfilled key criteria in document security and anti-corruption.
After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the state took a step that previously seemed politically impossible. On February 28, 2022, four days after the invasion began, Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership. On June 23, 2022, the European Council granted candidate status. At the same time, the European Commission identified seven reform blocks required to move to accession negotiations:
reform of the Constitutional Court, anti-corruption policy, judicial system cleansing, countering oligarchic influence, media reform, protection of national minorities’ rights, financial monitoring.
In 2023–2024, the European Commission acknowledged that most of these blocks had been completed or were being implemented. In 2025, Ukraine completed the full screening of the acquis communautaire a detailed analysis of national legislation’s compliance with EU law. This is a key technical prerequisite for launching negotiations.
At the same time, the European Commission recorded tangible progress in several areas. These include regional policyusing the DREAM digital platform, transport and approximation to TEN-T standards, green transition and energy efficiency, foreign policy, where alignment with EU positions exceeds 90%, and development of an inclusive environment, particularly for persons with disabilities. At this stage, Time for Action notes an important detail: procedurally, Ukraine has done the maximum possible under wartime conditions.
But 2025 also became a year of loud warning signals. In the summer, adoption of a bill that partially transferred control over NABU and SAPO to the Prosecutor General triggered the largest protests since the start of the full-scale invasion. Although these rallies did not match the scale of the Revolution of Dignity, they clearly marked a societal red line. De facto, it meant a loss of independence of anti-corruption institutions. After pressure from society and partners, NABU and SAPO’s powers were restored.
The European reaction was firm. French President Emmanuel Macron and President of the European Council António Costa personally called Zelenskyy. European Commission spokesperson Guillaume Mercier stated word for word:
“The European Union is concerned about Ukraine’s recent actions regarding its anti-corruption institutions NABU and SAPO. These institutions are crucial to Ukraine’s reform agenda and must operate independently to fight corruption and retain public trust.”
This episode became direct proof that European integration is no longer declarative it is a system of immediate accountability.
Another problematic dimension is IMF structural benchmarks. In the 2025 program, 58 benchmarks were defined. According to RRR4U analysts, three benchmarks have already not been met, and three more are at risk. According to Roman Nitsovych from DiXi Group, over three quarters of 2025 the state failed to meet five indicators, and in the fourth quarter must simultaneously catch up on 15 out of 20. This creates risks for further disbursements from international partners.
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Specific problems include the unregulated status of fintech companies operating “bank-in-a-smartphone” services, the unresolved issue of the “Lozovyi amendments”, which limit pre-trial investigation сроки, unupdated procedures for appointing supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises, and the absence of a permanent head of the Customs Service, whose competition is expected to conclude only in March 2026. The IMF reminds that a new four-year program of over $8 billion is critically important, and that in 2026–2029 Ukraine may need over $135 billion to cover budgetary needs.
In response, Ukraine and the EU agreed on a detailed action plan that allows progress even without formal opening of clusters due to political blockages within the EU itself. This concerns technical preparation for closing negotiation chapters. Priorities are clear: rule of law, independence of anti-corruption bodies, deep reform of criminal procedure, including repeal of the “Lozovyi amendments”, expansion of NABU and SAPO jurisdiction, review of the procedure for appointing the Prosecutor General with involvement of the Venice Commission, updating prosecutor selection rules, audit of the SBI, appointment of Constitutional Court judges and members of the High Council of Justice, strengthening the role of international experts in the HCJ, and adoption of an Anti-Corruption Strategy by Q2 2026.
The final balance is restrained. Ukraine submitted its EU application in 2022. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, alignment with EU foreign policy positions reached 95% in 2024 and 100% in the first months of 2025. At the same time, insider sources cited by the Financial Times mention 2026 as a possible but politically optimistic accession scenario. Alternative assessments point to no earlier than 2030.
The conclusion that must be fixed without illusions is straightforward: in 2025 Ukraine is technically ready for negotiations, but has not yet completed key institutional transformations. European integration is no longer measured by statements or symbolic decisions. It is measured by reform timelines, institutional independence, and the ability to meet commitments during wartime. This is where the real test of Europeanness lies.
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